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RECONSIDERING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
AND PLEA BARGAINING
RUSSELL COVEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through several decades of empirical and experimental research,
cognitive scientists have identified numerous ways in which human
reasoning diverges from the rational choice model employed by
mainstream economic theory and conventional law and economics.' In
assessing complex situations, people tend to focus on facts that are most
consistent with their interests (self-serving or egocentric bias) and to
ignore other facts that conflict with their interests (denial mechanisms
and blocks). People give greater credence to information that confirms
their pre-existing beliefs and less credence to information that conflicts
with those beliefs (confirmation bias). When assessing risk, people are
usually overconfident, believing that bad events are less likely to happen
to them than to others (overconfidence bias). They also are not very
good at assessing probabilities, particularly when the outcome in
question is a rare event (e.g., an earthquake or airplane crash), or where
there is limited information available from which to form a prediction.
As a result, they tend to rely on rules-of-thumb, or heuristics, to simplify
this task.2 Even apart from these particular cognitive traits, human
beings are imperfect calculators of costs and benefits due to inescapable
limits on information gathering and processing. Most people do not
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 18-20
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000).
2. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 1, at 11.
One example is the "availability heuristic," which suggests that recent incidents or events, or
those witnessed by or brought to the knowledge of an individual, are perceived as more likely
to occur than other incidents or outcomes. Id. Another example is the "representativeness
heuristic," which refers to the tendency of actors to assume that if one thing resembles
another thing, it likely is causally related to that thing. Id. at 4; Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (2000).
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attempt to absolutely maximize utility, as conventional economic theory
supposes, but merely to "satisfice." 3
Cognitive research has demonstrated flaws in several other
assumptions commonly employed by economic theorists. Economists
teach that rational maximizers should ignore sunk costs, but researchers
have discovered that sunk costs tend to influence actual decision
making. Economists assume that preferences are fixed and that
entitlements gravitate to their most-valued uses. Again, cognitive
research has demonstrated that these conventional assumptions are not
realistic. Preferences are not fixed but are subject to a variety of
distributional influences that complicate the efficient-market thesis.
Both of these cognitive tendencies can be attributed, at least in part, to a
strong aversion to losses (loss aversion) and to the related "endowment
effect," by which individuals tend to place a higher value on goods they
possess than on those they do not.
In recent years, criminal law scholars have begun to apply the
insights of this cognitive research to the study of plea bargaining with
important results.5 Combined with critical work demonstrating a variety
of systemic defects that undermine the market-efficiency thesis, this
research suggests that conventional law and economics descriptions of
plea bargaining as the product of the rational, bilateral exchange of
entitlements driven by punishment-maximization/minimization
strategies simply does not provide an adequate account of the plea
bargaining system.6 Although this research supplies a powerful basis on
which to reject the assumption that plea bargaining outcomes fairly and
accurately reflect law's shadows, it also gives rise to a puzzle.7 Most of
the cognitive quirks and biases identified by researchers, such as loss
aversion, overconfidence, overdiscounting, and self-serving bias, suggest
that defendants should be consistently disinclined to plead guilty and
that prosecutors and defendants should consistently disagree about what
3. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 136 (1956), reprinted in HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL
AND RATIONAL 261, 270-71 (1957).
4. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1086.
5. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
6. Id. at 2467.
7. The insight that bargaining occurs in the "shadow of law" was first developed in the
context of divorce, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979), and has been pursued in many
different legal domains. Professor Bibas contributed the most significant critique of the
shadow of law claim in the plea bargaining context. See generally Bibas, supra note 5.
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constitutes a fair price for a guilty plea. Were one to form predictions
about plea bargaining based only on cognitive research, it would be
logical to expect plea bargaining to be a rare occurrence. Of course, it is
not. Plea bargaining is far and away the predominant procedural
mechanism for the resolution of criminal charges s Criminal trials, not
plea bargains, are the oddity.
Some of the pioneering work in this area-by Professor Bibas and
others-accepts plea bargaining as a given and examines the impact that
cognitive bias has on the bargaining decisions made by prosecutors and
defendants. That work concludes that cognitive bias sometimes impedes
defendants from accepting utility-enhancing plea offers and less
frequently induces defendants to accept utility-diminishing plea
bargains. 9 This Essay reconsiders the relationship between cognitive
bias and plea bargaining by asking a different question. It does not seek
to explain why parties sometimes fail to agree to utility-enhancing
bargains, but instead asks why plea bargaining is so prevalent
notwithstanding the existence of plea-discouraging cognitive bias. The
answer further elucidates and amends the standard law-and-economics
account of plea bargaining: not only is the criminal justice system
functionally designed to induce defendants to plead guilty (a now banal
observation), but many apparently arbitrary and oppressive features of
current criminal practice can be explained largely as devices whose
function, in whole or in part, is to neutralize the plea-discouraging
effects of cognitive bias. Incorporation of the insights of cognitive
psychology into plea bargaining theory thus provides a more nuanced
explanation of the shape of many features of the criminal justice system.
Taking cognitive bias into account casts new light on the factors that
drive plea bargaining outcomes, including the magnitude of sentencing
differentials, the pervasiveness of pretrial detention, and the prosaic
8. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 37, 42 (2006) (noting state and federal data indicating that "[r]oughly 95% of
adjudicated cases result in guilty pleas"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.5.46.2002 (2002), available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdfft5462002.pdf (reporting that in 2002, ninety-five percent of state felony
convictions were the result of guilty pleas).
9. Bibas, supra note 5, at 2467-68; see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1925-27 (1992) (acknowledging possible impact
of cognitive bias on plea bargaining but arguing that benefits of plea bargaining, as well as
various procedural devices already in place, diminish the importance of any cognitive bias
that might affect defendants' plea bargaining choices). For an early attempt that did address
this question squarely, see generally Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty
Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205 (discussed infra at Part III.A).
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procedural brutality that is a universal feature of virtually every
encounter with the system.
Part II of this Essay examines in more detail different types of
cognitive bias and evaluates the likely impact of those biases on plea
bargaining. It concludes that cognitive bias, if left unchecked, should
discourage resolution of criminal cases through negotiated settlement
contrary to the predictions of simple economic analysis. Part III
assesses a variety of features of the criminal justice system that work to
check these tendencies.
II. COGNITIVE BIAS AND PLEA BARGAINING
A. Bounded Rationality
Bounded rationality refers to the relatively obvious proposition that
"human cognitive abilities are not infinite.""' People do not attempt to
ruthlessly maximize utility. At most, they are likely to "satisfice"; that
is, once they have identified an option that appears "good enough," they
will discontinue their search and select that option."
Bounded rationality presents a problem for the economic model of
plea bargaining, which requires prosecutors and defendants alike to
rationally calculate the value of plea offers based on a variety of
difficult-to-predict inputs. According to conventional economic theory,
the value of a plea bargain is determined by reference to opportunity
cost.' 2 The opportunity cost of a guilty plea is forfeiture of the right to a
trial. Therefore, the value of a guilty plea depends on the expected
value of trial.'3 Defendants seeking to minimize punishment rationally
should prefer plea bargains whenever the expected punishment resulting
from a guilty plea (Vp) is less than the expected trial sentence multiplied
by the probability of conviction, minus the added resource costs (if any)
10. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
11. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 261.
12. See Nicola Boari & Gianluca Fiorentini, An Economic Analysis of Plea Bargaining:
The Incentives of the Parties in a Mixed Penal System, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 213, 222
(2001) (stating that defendants' choice to plead guilty turns on an evaluation of "the
monetary and opportunity costs born from the phase of indictment till the disposition of his
case at trial or as a result of plea bargaining").
13. Scholars applying economic theory to civil litigation have relied on similar
assumptions. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. 193, 194 (2007) ("[L]aw and economics scholarship has subscribed to the conventional
wisdom that the value of a legal dispute is its expected value, defined as the probability of
liability multiplied by the expected judgment amount.").
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of trial."
Although simple to calculate on paper, the pervasive uncertainties of
criminal litigation make practical application of the formula more
problematic. To make the correct decision, the parties must at
minimum estimate the probability that the defendant will be convicted
at trial; predict what punishment will be imposed if the defendant is
convicted; estimate the costs involved in litigation, including attorneys
fees, time lost waiting in court, and the psychological stress of non-
resolution; and then calculate the ex ante trial sentence by multiplying
the expected trial sentence by the probability of conviction, discounted
by the estimated process costs. They then must predict what punishment
will be imposed if they enter a guilty plea and compare those two values
in order to decide which course of action to select.
Given the complexity of these tasks and the information deficits
typical during the plea bargaining process, valuation estimates are
certain to vary widely. Probabilities of conviction depend on a wide
assortment of factors that are hard to predict. Defendants may not
know what evidence the state has gathered or whether that evidence will
be persuasive to a jury. If there are witnesses, defendants will not know
whether the witnesses will show up on the day of trial, what they will say
if they do, or whether the testimony given will be credible. Defendants
cannot know in advance who will be on the jury, and thus they cannot
estimate how sympathetic the jury might be to their case. At the same
time, because most sentencing systems assign a range rather than a
specific outcome, defendants may have only a general notion of the
sentence they would actually receive upon conviction. That
indeterminacy is diminished by a guilty plea only where defendants are
offered plea bargains carrying specific sentences rather than charge
concessions or sentence recommendations. In any case, defendants
often may have only a fuzzy notion of the likely consequences of
entering a guilty plea, making any comparative assessment of plea
bargaining even more difficult.
14. In economic terms, the expected value of a guilty plea can be calculated pursuant to
the formula Vp = (P*Et) - R, where Vp represents the value of the guilty plea, P is the
probability of conviction, Et is the expected sentence upon conviction at trial, and R is the
resource cost of trial. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1988). Both plea bargains and trials entail resource
costs, but trials usually consume substantially more resource costs-both in terms of pretrial
preparation and court time, and often, post-conviction review-than guilty pleas.
Accordingly, R here represents the marginal resource costs of trial above those expended for
guilty pleas.
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In short, the plethora of variables, the absence of reliable
information, and the difficulty of making accurate predictions would
seem to create substantial obstacles to careful, precise, and accurate
decision making in plea bargaining. It is not immediately obvious how
this uncertainty should impact plea bargaining. Uncertainty by itself
could, in theory, make plea bargaining either more or less likely
depending largely on the particular defendant's risk tolerance. 5
However, consideration of several additional well-documented cognitive
biases working in combination with the high level of uncertainty
inherent in criminal litigation supports a prediction that boundedly-
rational defendants will disproportionately disfavor guilty pleas in favor
of trials.
B. Overconfidence and Self-Serving Biases
Cognitive research demonstrates that when it comes to evaluating
risk, people are consistently overconfident. Most people believe they
are above average drivers; are healthier, smarter, and more ethical than
others; and that good things will happen to them more often and bad
things less often than statistics predict. 6 Similarly, people typically
evaluate information selectively, giving more attention and credence to
information that is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs. This
tendency is referred to as "confirmation," "egocentric," or "self-serving"
bias, and it has been well-documented by researchers. 7 People persist
in their inaccurate beliefs even where they are expressly informed of the
probabilities and educated about the existence and effects of such
biases.1
8
The effect of these biases on plea bargaining seems fairly
predictable. Overconfident criminal defendants should be expected
15. Persons who are risk averse should view uncertainty as a "disutility" and thus be
more likely to pursue a risk-minimization strategy, while persons who prefer risk should do
the opposite. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (3d ed. 1986) (noting
that expected utility of a benefit under conditions of uncertainty varies depending on risk
preference of individual).
16. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Bias, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 355, 356 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).
17. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (citing numerous studies demonstrating
existence of self-serving bias).
18. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 16, at 361 (describing results of experiment
showing that informing participants about self-serving bias did not affect tendency to
interpret ambiguous data in self-serving way).
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consistently to overestimate the probability that they will prevail at trial.
Prosecutors and defendants should look at the same evidence and have
consistently divergent views as to its persuasiveness to a judge or jury.
As a result, the parties should tend to disagree about all of the inputs to
the plea-pricing formula, including the probability of conviction, the
trial sentence, and the plea sentence. Because overconfidence makes it
more difficult for the parties to reach a compromise that both sides
perceive to be mutually beneficial, the predicted result is over-litigation
of disputes.19
C. Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion
Another well-documented cognitive phenomenon that is in tension
with plea bargaining is loss aversion." Loss aversion describes the
tendency of actors to protect gains by shunning risk while
simultaneously preferring risk where it promises a chance to avoid
taking a loss.2' Because a plea bargain is a trade of a certain loss (a
conviction and punishment) for a chance of no loss (an acquittal)
accompanied by a chance of a greater loss (a trial conviction and
enhanced sentence), cognitive research suggests that, all else being
equal, most persons would prefer to gamble on total exoneration at trial
rather than accept a certain, though likely smaller, punishment by
pleading guilty.22 It also supports a prediction that while defendants
should seek out risk in order to avoid taking losses, prosecutors' plea
bargaining conduct will be comparatively conservative since their
incentives are reversed.
The documented fact that people tend to be less averse to loss-
19. This prediction seems to hold in the civil context. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (2003) (stating
that "excess confidence impedes settlement" and produces "an excess of litigation").
20. See Birke, supra note 9.
21. Risk aversion in the realm of gains can be reconciled with economic theory through
the concept of "diminishing marginal utility." See POSNER, supra note 15, at 12. Because a
dollar gained has less utility than the last dollar possessed, the chance of losing that last dollar
is not fully compensated by the chance to win an additional one. Applied to the domain of
losses, however, diminishing marginal utility seems to predict that people will be equally risk
averse in protecting against losses since the loss of two dollars is greater than two times the
loss of one dollar. Cognitive research shows that people are nonetheless willing to assume the
risk of large losses to try to prevent small losses.
22. See Birke, supra note 9, at 209 (arguing that defense counsel is responsible for
persuading defendants to abandon utility-enhancing trials); Ian Weinstein, Don't Believe
Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783,
799 (2003) (noting that a "client will have a greater tendency to accept a plea offer preceded
by bad news").
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avoiding risk than to gain-maximizing risk is paralleled by the more
general observation that risk-preference curves vary. Rational choice
theory assumes either indifference to risk or risk aversion, 23 but some
people-gamblers and mountain climbers, for instance-affirmatively
seek out risk (at least within delimited spheres of their lives).
Preferences toward risk can vary for individuals, depending on context.
Because a trial represents risk, the tendency of many people to avoid
risk might lead them to avoid trials in favor of plea bargains. However,
because risk aversion decreases where risky actions carry the potential
of averting losses, the general tendency toward risk aversion might well
be outweighed by loss aversion in the context of serious criminal
charges. Moreover, criminals as a class would seem to be risk seekers
rather than risk avoiders. 24 Accordingly, loss aversion and risk seeking
should tend to increase most criminal defendants' preferences for trials
over plea bargains.
Loss aversion is likely related to another hard-wired cognitive
characteristic: the endowment effect.25 Conventional economic theory
assumes that individuals' preferences are fixed and that the assignment
of entitlements does not affect subjective valuations, but research has
shown that this assumption is unrealistic. The endowment effect
describes a phenomenon documented in several studies by which the
initial distribution of entitlements directly affects preferences because
individuals consistently place a higher valuation on goods they possess
than on those they do not.
Criminal defendants as a class can claim few endowments, but one
the system provides is the right to a trial. That right is intuitively and
widely understood. A defendant charged with a serious criminal offense
should be expected to place a high valuation on the right, particularly
once the prospect of a trial becomes tangible. This enhanced valuation
should necessarily increase the defendant's subjective valuation of the
worth of his guilty plea, further increasing the size of the plea discount
necessary to induce the defendant to relinquish it.
23. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL.
L. REV. 113, 121 (1996) ("Expected utility theory predicts that people make either risk-averse
or risk-neutral choices.").
24. Many commentators at least assume, based on the fact that criminals opt to engage
in inherently risky activities, that they have a higher tolerance, or even an affirmative
preference, for risk. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 2495 (hypothesizing that innocent
defendants are more risk averse than guilty defendants).
25. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 205-06 (2006) (noting the relationship between loss aversion, endowment effect, and
framing effect).
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D. Overdiscounting
Related but distinct from risk preference is time preference, or
discounting. Some discounting is plainly rational. Ceteris paribus, it is
always marginally better to consume a good now (or defer a bad until
later) than to defer gratification until tomorrow (or suffer the bad
consequence now), for the simple reason that tomorrow may never
come. 26  However, while some discounting is rational, significant
discounting may not be. People who overdiscount by disproportionately
valuing present utility over future utility make a cognitive error. One
may or may not be aware of the error. A person who fails to perceive
the time preference error is overdiscounting, while a person who
understands the time preference error but who cannot delay
gratification, notwithstanding a desire to, manifests "bounded
willpower."27 In both cases, actors' choices do not maximize expected
utility in the manner that rational choice theory predicts.
Just as there is strong reason to suspect that criminals as a class are
likely to be less risk averse than others, there is also reason to suspect
that they are more likely to overdiscount and to display bounded
willpower. As a result, most persons charged with crimes should be
expected to place a greater-than-average value on the short-term
consequences of their actions and a smaller-than-average value on risks
that will manifest only in the long term. The emphasis on the near
horizon necessarily should make trial a more appealing prospect
because it carries the promise of near-term freedom, rather than plea
bargains, which guarantee near-term punishment. To entice an
overdiscounting defendant to relinquish his or her trial right,
prosecutors need to offer proportionately larger sentence discounts than
economic theory would otherwise predict.
E. Fairness Bias
In addition to these cognitive distortions in economic rationality,
researchers have identified an additional phenomenon-the "fairness"
bias-that regularly leads individuals to act in ways not predicted by
26. To quote the eminent economist, Janis Joplin: "If you got it today you don't want it
tomorrow, man, 'cause you don't need it, 'cause as a matter of fact, as we discovered in the
train, tomorrow never happens, man." JANIS JOPLIN, Ball and Chain, on JOPLIN IN
CONCERT (Sony 1972), available at http://www.sing365.com/music/Lyric.nsf/Ball-and-Chain-
in-album-Joplin-in-Concert-lyrics-Janis-Joplin/8BBEEAFB100CBB9548256959002C9054.
27. See Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1479 (defining bounded willpower as instances in
which human beings take actions "they know to be in conflict with their own long-term
interests").
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rational choice theory.' Considered in the plea bargaining context, the
fairness bias provides an additional factor that might be expected to
impede plea bargaining.
Research into perceptions of fairness demonstrates that self-
interested, utility-maximizing behavior is moderated where such pure,
short-term maximizing behavior is in tension with perceptions of
fairness. That people do not always try to fully maximize their self-
interest is demonstrated in experiments involving the "ultimatum
game," in which player A is given a sum of money (say, $20) and must
divide that sum with player B. Player B has no control over the size of
the shares but can reject any proposed distribution, in which case
neither party gets to keep the money. Straight rational choice theory
suggests that Player A will propose a division giving him almost all of
the $20 and Player B very little (say, $19 to $1, or even $19.99 to $0.01),
and that Player B will accept that proposal, since, ex ante, that strategy
maximizes both players' expected utility. After all, Player A maximizes
expected utility by keeping as much of the pot as possible, and even
when offered a small share, Player B is still better off by taking it than
by rejecting it. Studies of the ultimatum game in 'practice, however,
indicate that low offers are consistently rejected despite the fact that
doing so fails to maximize expected utility. 29 Although such conduct is
not consistent with the assumption of simple expected-utility
maximization, it is explainable by reference to considerations of
fairness. That is, in some situations, people willingly sacrifice their own
short-term utility to avoid being treated "unfairly," or to punish the
other party for acting unfairly."°
Given widespread perceptions among defendants that the criminal
justice system does not treat them fairly," the fairness bias might be
expected to encourage some defendants-especially, but not only,
factually innocent ones-to reject utility-enhancing plea bargains simply
because the outcome strikes them as unjust or because they seek to
punish prosecutors for making offers they perceive to be unfair.
Like self-serving bias, loss aversion, overdiscounting, and bounded
willpower, fairness bias distorts outcomes predicted by expected utility-
28. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1135-38 (discussing impact of social norm of
fairness on utility maximizing strategies).
29. See id. (discussing empirical research).
30. See Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1494.
31. James H. McGinnis & Kenneth A. Carlson, Offenders' Perceptions of Their
Sentences, 5 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING SERVICES & REHABILITATION, Mar. 1982, at 27, 29-
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maximization theory. Cognitive research thus depicts a bargaining
context dominated by converging vectors all pointing away from
negotiated settlements and in the direction of adversarial dispute
resolution. Although each of these phenomena by itself might have
only a marginal impact (or no impact at all) on individual cases, taken
together, they likely create powerful cognitive resistance to guilty pleas.
III. FEATURES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT OVERCOME
COGNITIVE RESISTANCE TO PLEA BARGAINING
Given these cognitive tendencies, the decks would seem to be
stacked against plea bargaining. A plea bargain asks overconfident,
risk-preferring individuals to agree to suffer certain adverse
consequences while abandoning trial rights with which they are
endowed and which offer the only possible path to a loss-free outcome.
In addition, the increased risk assumed by going to trial involves risk of
added punishment that would not be consumed until some future date-
perhaps one far off into the future. To convince a criminal defendant to
agree to a plea bargain, in other words, the prosecutor must overcome
overconfidence and self-serving biases, risk preferences, loss aversion,
the endowment effect, perceptions of fairness, over-discounting, and
bounded willpower. What is more, because most criminal defendants do
not pay their own legal costs but instead receive state-compensated
lawyers, one of the most significant economic incentives to compromise
litigation-legal costs-is frequently not part of the defendant's
calculus.32
How, then, does the system manage to induce so many defendants to
relinquish their trial rights and accept guilty pleas in light of the strong
cognitive preference to do precisely the opposite?33 In short, by every
means possible. All things being equal, cognitive biases may well impel
defendants to opt for trial, but things are far from equal. The criminal
justice system contains numerous levers to induce defendants to
abandon their right to trial and to accept a guilty plea, and its evolution
has tended, with few exceptions, to expand and strengthen these levers.
32. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1997) (stating that approximately eighty percent of
defendants receive appointed counsel).
33. As Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld long ago pointed out, "any policy that
increases litigation costs, lowers settlement costs, or makes disputants pessimistic about their
trial prospects, will increase settlements." Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067,
1076 (1989).
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These facets of the criminal justice system have long been apparent to
even the most casual of observers of the system.34 What has not been
fully appreciated, however, is the way they function to overcome
cognitive biases that otherwise would impede plea bargaining.
The next part of the Essay describes several of these counterweights,
starting with the most obvious and, undoubtedly, the most powerful: the
simple fact that in the vast majority of cases, defendants who plead
guilty get outcomes that are not only better than can be expected at
trial, but better by orders of magnitude.
A. Overcoming Loss Aversion and Bounded Rationality with Orders of
Magnitude: High Plea Discounts and Punitive Trial Penalties
The tension between loss aversion and the high guilty plea rate was
first noted by Professor Richard Birke in one of the earliest scholarly
efforts to apply the insights of cognitive psychology to plea bargaining.35
In that article, Birke considered several explanations for the puzzling
persistence of extraordinarily high plea rates in light of the natural
tendency of decision makers to take risks to avoid certain losses. As
Birke pointed out, one explanation for why loss-averse criminal
defendants plead guilty in such great numbers is that they are
consistently getting such "good deals"-that is, plea bargains in which
the "utility value of the plea" is so much higher than that of trial that
even loss-averse defendants cannot say no.36 Birke rejected this
hypothesis, however, for a variety of reasons. First, he contended that
political and judicial checks on bargaining would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for prosecutors to systematically offer such deals to
defendants.37 Prosecutors would be inhibited from making sufficiently
34. In his comprehensive critique of the plea bargaining system, Professor Albert
Alschuler has extensively documented most, if not all, of them. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 652 (1981) (arguing
for the abolition of plea bargaining because it is "an inherently unfair and irrational
process"); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975) [hereinafter Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role] (arguing that "nothing
short of the abolition of plea bargaining promises a satisfactory resolution" of plea
bargaining's shortfalls); see also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 22-24 (2003) (tracing factors leading to
dominance of plea bargaining); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979, 1981 (1992).
35. Birke, supra note 9, at 207.
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 221-23.
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good offers, he argued, because of political opposition to perceived soft
treatment of criminals. 3 At the same time, judges should be disinclined
to allow defendants to plead guilty on such lenient terms. Birke argued
that in sentencing guideline jurisdictions, a judge's authority to impose a
highly discounted sentence would be limited by the guidelines, 39 and in
non-guideline jurisdictions, judges themselves would likely balk where
plea-bargained guilty pleas did not reflect the true magnitude of the
defendant's offense." Second, Birke argued that sentencing guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentencing statutes check the ability of
prosecutors to make offers sufficiently low to induce defendants in weak
cases to plead guilty.4" Third, Birke argued that constitutional restraints
should check excessively lenient plea offers.42 Such plea offers, he
argued, would either constitute under-punishment of crime or would
effectively chill the constitutional right to trial.43  Assuming that
prosecutors have no interest in the former, the "good deals" hypothesis
necessarily implies that defendants routinely are coerced by fear of the
trial penalty to abandon their constitutional rights, an outcome
inconsistent with widely accepted constitutional principles." Finally,
Birke noted that the worst predicted trial outcomes are often mitigated
by compromise verdicts and jury nullification, and that defendants
themselves should rationally interpret lenient plea offers as
prosecutorial admissions of evidentiary weakness.45 Birke concluded
that the "good deals" hypothesis simply could not be true and that the
high plea rate was most likely a result of defendants receiving bad or
biased legal counsel. 6 Although Birke's conclusion that defendants
often receive inadequate legal representation and deficient advice
undoubtedly has merit, Birke's rejection of the "good deals" hypothesis
is due for reconsideration.
1. Plea Discount Magnitudes
There is no definitive evidence establishing just how large the mine-
run plea discount/trial penalty really is, but what evidence is available
38. Id. at 221-22.
39. Id. at 222.
40. Id. at 222-23.
41. Id. at 225-26.
42. Id. at 228-29.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 229.
46. Id. at 239-40.
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suggests that it is very large indeed.47 State sentencing statistics for 2002
show the median sentence for all felony cases adjudicated by guilty pleas
to be 36 months, and the median sentence following jury trial conviction
at 120 months, a 333% trial penalty.48 The mean statistics are similar: 52
months for guilty pleas, and 140 months for jury trials, a 292% trial
penalty.49
Of course, gross statistics comparing trial sentences to plea sentences
might miss important factors that account for some of the disparity.
Perhaps the cases that go to trial are consistently more serious than the
cases that plead out. The opposite, however, may also be true; the raw
statistics simply provide no answer to that question. A leading recent
study of plea discount rates led by Professor Nancy King used regression
analysis to isolate the impact of method-of-conviction on severity of
sentence:" Drawing on a limited data pool, the study found consistent
evidence of a trial penalty ranging in size from roughly 13% to 461%,
depending on the state and the offense of conviction.5 Others have
calculated average state trial penalties of 300%, rising in some states to
as high as 500%. s2  Abundant anecdotal evidence indicates that even
higher trial penalties are not uncommon, particularly in dispositions of
first-time offenders eligible for probation or other non-incarcerative
disposition.
47. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 109 (2005) (noting possibility that "rational prosecutor must
set a 'market-clearing' price high enough to obtain guilty pleas even in weak cases") (citing
Hans Zeisel, The Offer That Cannot Be Refused, in FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S.
FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND
REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 558, 559-60 (1980) ("[T]he greater the difference between
the offered sentence and the sentence expected after conviction at trial, the more defendants
will plead guilty and avoid trial.")).
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS,
2002 tbl.4.5 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf02.pdf.
49. Id.
50. See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
959, 992 (2005).
51. Id. The data pool in the King study was limited in part by the design of the study,
which focused on bench trial outcomes as well as guilty plea and trial outcomes.
52. See Candace McCoy, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Hammer: The Trial Penalty in
the USA, in THE JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23, 27 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003)
(noting statistics showing that trial penalty in most states averages 300% ("mean sentence
imposed in all felony offenses: 54 months after guilty plea versus 150 months after jury
verdict") and in some cases rises as high as 500%).
53. See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 38-39 (2005) (recounting sentencing of seventeen-
year-old defendant in car theft case who was offered conditional discharge by sentencing
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But large as they are, these figures fail to capture the actual trial
penalties at work because they compare only outcome disparities
between guilty pleas and trials for the same offense of conviction. That,
however, is the wrong comparison. In most cases, by pleading guilty a
defendant not only bargains for the opportunity to receive a more
lenient sentence for the offense of conviction, but he also receives the
opportunity to plead guilty to a less serious charge carrying a less
onerous penalty. To calculate the actual plea discount in any particular
case, one must compare the sentence imposed on the lesser charge to
which the defendant pleaded guilty with the sentence that would have
been imposed after conviction on potentially higher charges at trial.
An accurate estimate of the operative trial penalty, therefore,
depends not only on raw sentence differentials but also on the amount
and type of charge dismissal and movement that accompanies typical
plea bargains.54 Although it is quite difficult to estimate the typical
additional discount resulting from such charge reductions, that
additional discount need not itself be large to have large effects. A 10%
discount resulting from a charge reduction, for example, would magnify
the average 300% trial penalty by 33% (that is, increase the trial penalty
from 300% to 333%), while a 50% reduction would double the penalty
to 600% (and the "high-end" penalties to 1000% or more).55 Although
judge in a case that could have resulted in up to a seven-year term if convicted at trial).
Substantial trial penalties can often be manufactured merely by credible application of the
statutory sentencing range for an offense, which is often expansive. Where the judge
participates in plea bargaining, as is the practice in some jurisdictions, the credibility of the
implied threat to impose a much stiffer sentence after conviction than offered before trial is
undoubtedly substantial. Id. at 42-43 (describing judge's offer to defendant of a minimum
six-year term for armed robbery, where maximum penalty is thirty years).
54. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1938-
39 (2006) (reviewing data from North Carolina showing that charge reductions are common
and have "a large effect on average sentence severity"); id. at 1946-47 (reporting results of
study indicating that prosecutorial charge reductions account for an approximately twenty-
five percent plea discount on average (from 210 to 164 months), and that judges' sentencing
discounts further increased plea discounts by another sixty percent on average (from 164 to
64 months)).
55. Fifty percent does not seem to be an unrealistic discount resulting from charge
bargaining. As a point of comparison, in Virginia the difference in average sentence for first-
degree versus second-degree murder is about fifty percent. See VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N,
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 47 & figs.40 & 41 (2005), available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/
2005FULLAnnualReport.pdf; Richard S. Frase, Defining the Limits of Crime Control and
Due Process, 73 CAL. L. REV. 212, 227 (1985) (reviewing HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1982)) ("Zeisel's data on charge bargaining suggest that defendants who
plead guilty are receiving substantial concessions in the level of conviction they could expect
if they went to trial: an average reduction of 2.3 crime classes."). Zeisel estimated that the
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there is no comprehensive data on charge movement patterns," it is easy
to see that charge bargaining can result in enormous discounts. In a
typical case described by one New York defense attorney, a defendant
faced burglary charges carrying a statutory maximum term of thirty
years. By negotiating a plea to unlawful entry (a lesser included
offense-essentially, burglary minus intent to commit a felony-that
carried a maximum sentence of six months), the lawyer won (at least on
paper) a sixty-fold sentence discount. 7 Similarly, a typical plea bargain
in a homicide case might involve an agreement to plead guilty to a
second-degree murder charge in exchange for dismissal of a first-degree
murder charge.5 8 The sentencing differential between first- and second-
degree murder can easily approach or exceed 100%.'9 A murder charge
reduced to manslaughter represents an even greater reduction, one that
in federal court averages approximately 650%. 6' Again, although we
currently lack data about how often such charge reductions occur, it
seems likely that plea bargains entailing these sorts of charge reductions
are fairly routine."
Prosecutors possess a wide array of tools that enable them to reduce
charges in ways likely to result in substantially enhanced plea discounts.
Not only may prosecutors simply permit guilty pleas to offenses carrying
substantially reduced sentences, they may select charges tactically to
expand the sentence differential when doing so provides desired
bargaining leverage.62 For example, prosecutors may (and do) offer
average reward for pleading guilty, separated from any additional discount motivated by
evidentiary problems, was 1.6 crime classes. HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT 35 (1982).
56. See Wright & Engen, supra note 54, at 1938 (noting lack of systematic empirical
research on the frequency of prosecutorial charge reductions or their impact on sentence).
57. See JAMES S. KUNEN, "How CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?" THE MAKING
OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 95 (1983).
58. See id. at 167-68 (discussing case of a client indicted for first-degree murder, armed
robbery, and carrying a pistol without a license, who plead guilty to second-degree murder
while armed, and robbery).
59. See VA. CRIM. SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 55, at 47 & figs.41 & 42 (showing that
median sentence for first-degree murder conviction of offenders with prior criminal history is
43.2 years, while second-degree murder conviction of same category offenders is 21.9 years).
60. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET tbl.7 (2006),
available at http://www.uscs.gov/JUDPACK/2006/lcB6.pdf (showing that national federal
median sentence for manslaughter is thirty-seven months, and for murder 240 months).
61. See Wright & Engen, supra note 54, at 1938-39 (reporting data from North Carolina
indicating that "roughly half of all felony cases that resulted in conviction" represented
charge reductions from initial charges filed, and that these charge reductions had a "large
effect on average sentence severity").
62. See Jon M. Sands, Book Review, FED. LAW., May 2004, at 55, 56 (reviewing
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defendants with criminal histories opportunities to avoid career criminal
"three-strikes" sentences in exchange for guilty pleas.63  They can
substitute a charge not subject to a mandatory minimum for one that is,
they can "stack" charges carrying mandatory minimums in order to
threaten or impose dramatic increases in mandatory sentences after a
trial conviction, 64 or they can make available safety-valve provisions that
waive statutory minimums to defendants who plead guilty.5  In states
like California, the penal code gives prosecutors flexibility to charge
some crimes either as felonies or misdemeanors. Where a defendant
commits a so-called "wobbler" offense, the difference between going to
trial and pleading guilty might mean the difference between a felony
theft conviction carrying substantial prison time and a misdemeanor
theft conviction and probation. These tools only bolster other
mechanisms, such as "substantial assistance" provisions, which permit
prosecutors to directly obtain discounted sentences for defendants who
plead guilty.66
Thus, although Professor Birke may well have been correct in
concluding that plea discounts approaching 80% may often be required
to induce loss-averse defendants to plead guilty in weak cases, sufficient
data exists to suggest that plea discounts of that magnitude are common,
if not routine. Boundedly-rational defendants may have substantial
difficulty estimating whether the probability of conviction in their case is
50% or 90%, and thus might well be quite insensitive to marginal
differences in plea offers. However, where defendants are offered the
opportunity to avoid a 600% trial penalty, even substantial variances in
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA (2003)) (noting that in author's experience as an assistant federal defender that the
prosecutor has power in drug cases to select charges so that the defendant faces five years, ten
years, forty years, or life in prison).
63. See David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2005)
(providing empirical data demonstrating that prosecutors evade three-strikes laws by
disproportionately charging lesser offenses against offenders who otherwise would be subject
to three-strikes sentences).
64. See Sands, supra note 62, at 56 (noting that federal firearm counts can be stacked so
that defendant with co-defendant carrying firearm might face life term).
65. Safety valve provisions often permit judges to avoid imposing mandatory minimum
sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated
Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 294 (2005) (noting that
prosecutors' charging decisions determine whether safety valve provisions and other
reductions apply); Weinstein, supra note 22, at 807 n.68 (discussing application of federal
safety-valve provision to first time offenders).
66. King, supra note 65, at 294.
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estimated probabilities fail to undermine the rational inducement to
plead guilty.67 Rationality may be bounded, but it is not inoperative.
Large sentencing differentials dramatically reduce ambiguity by
exaggerating the penal consequences of the choice to contest a criminal
charge, and thus make it easier for even boundedly-rational and loss-
averse decision makers to make a utility-enhancing decision to plead
guilty.
2. Illusory Checks on Plea Discount Magnitude
Assuming the plea discount is as large as the data indicate it to be,
how is it possible that such plea discounts can survive the many checks
and constraints identified by Professor Birke? The answer, I suspect, is
that these checks are either wholly illusory or have been compensated
for in the evolution of the plea bargaining system. First, political checks
on the plea bargaining practices of most DAs are likely much weaker
than Birke's argument supposes for at least two reasons. In all but a
handful of high-visibility cases, the general public is probably not
concerned with, or even aware of, the dispositions of criminal cases.
The same is not true in high-visibility cases, and therefore in those cases
prosecutors (and judges) are less likely to negotiate unduly lenient
dealsi6 Because only a tiny number of cases ever crack the media radar
screen, however, these high profile cases can be handled in atypical
ways.69 In all the rest, most prosecutors have virtually unchecked
67. This was precisely the deal offered to Ian Weinstein's client, James Worth. See
Weinstein, supra note 22, at 799. Worth was charged with conspiracy to sell five kilograms of
cocaine. Id. at 793. His likely sentence after conviction at trial was ten to twelve years, id. at
806-07, and given the strong evidence, the likelihood of conviction was over ninety percent.
Id. at 806 n.66. Although, as Professor Weinstein recounts, Mr. Worth was initially reluctant
to plead guilty, id. at 830, and exhibited several cognitive biases in reaching that estimation-
including overconfidence, id. at 829, representativeness bias, and egocentric bias-he
ultimately came to see the merits of pleading guilty. Id. at 809-15. After entering a
cooperation agreement, Worth ultimately received a sentence of twenty-two months time
served. Id. at 831. Had he gone to trial, been convicted, and sentenced to the upper end of
the estimated range, the trial penalty would have exceeded 600%.
68. Although I lack empirical data to verify my intuition, I am confident that criminal
cases involving celebrities are resolved by plea bargains far less often than cases of equal
seriousness involving non-celebrities.
69. The recent controversy surrounding hotel heiress Paris Hilton's travails following a
D.U.I. conviction illustrate the point. In the Hilton case, a furor erupted following L.A.
County Sheriff Lee Baca's decision to release Hilton from prison and to permit her to serve
the remainder of her forty-five-day jail term in home confinement. Sharon Waxman,
Celebrity Justice Cuts Both Ways for Paris Hilton, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at Al. Such
sentence modifications in misdemeanor cases are routine due to overcrowding in L.A. county
prisons. Id. In Hilton's case, however, the sentencing judge intervened and ordered Hilton to
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freedom to negotiate criminal charges in whatever way they believe will
maximize utility. Cognitive research suggests that freedom will translate
into more generous compromise offers than straightforward utility
maximization theory would otherwise predict. Because a plea bargain
represents a gain from the status quo to a prosecutor, her bargaining
decisions will be more risk averse, thus providing further explanation for
the large documented sentencing differentials noted above."
Admittedly, even though the public may not generally be aware of
individual case dispositions through the media, it might nonetheless
come to perceive that cases are being settled on the cheap and that
criminals are being "under-punished" through the accretion of
anecdotal accounts of persons directly or indirectly involved in cases as
victims, witnesses, jurors, or their friends and relatives. Although
under-punishment is a consistent criticism made by opponents of plea
bargaining,7' it is not clear how strongly that view persists. Indeed, the
body of critical weight now leans overwhelmingly toward the view that
defendants are, if anything, over- rather than under-punished, and both
surveys and sentencing behavior demonstrate that most judges also
believe that defendants are over-punished as a result of sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences.
Second, systematic over-punishment is not inconsistent with a high
plea discount rate. Because the plea discount rate is a product of the
sentencing differential between plea and trial sentences, plea sentences
may be both fully proportional to criminal wrongdoing and yet
substantially discounted, as long as the alternative trial sentence is
proportionately harsher. The dramatic increases in sentence length over
be returned to prison, an extraordinary step almost certainly motivated by the media's intense
scrutiny of the case. Id.
70. The contrasting risk tolerances of parties depending on whether they are seeking
gain or defending against loss is illustrated in the literature documenting divergences in
bargaining strategies among plaintiffs and defendants in civil litigation. See Rachlinski, supra
note 23, at 159 (reporting data showing that plaintiffs were more risk averse than defendants
in bargaining; while many plaintiffs were willing to accept negotiated settlements below their
expected value, more defendants adopted risk-seeking strategies by refusing to make
sufficient settlement offers to avoid trial).
71. See, e.g., Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining,
32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 97 (1989) (reporting that a majority of persons surveyed believe plea
bargaining results in overly lenient sentences).
72. See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd, Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 559 (2007) ("Surveys of federal judges and
many federal judicial opinions demonstrate that many federal judges perceive federal
sentencing guidelines to be too harsh and inflexible.").
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the past several decades73 are consistent with the goals of muting plea
bargaining critics' claims that plea sentences are too lenient while
preserving the enormous efficiency gains inherent in plea bargaining.
Third, precisely because sentencing guideline systems and
mandatory minimums have tended to increase the severity of trial
sentences over what judges not bound by such regimes would impose,
their main effect has been to simply make trial sentences harsher. They
can have the discount-limiting effect that Professor Birke attributes to
them only if they also prevent prosecutors from making (and judges
from accepting) plea offers below the guideline range or mandatory
minimum term. However, ample evidence indicates that prosecutors
are not ultimately constrained by guidelines or mandatory minimums in
crafting charges that result in desired penal outcomes. As Jeffrey
Standen has observed, prosecutors' enormous discretion over charging
and the complexity and redundancy of most criminal codes allows
prosecutors virtually total control over trial sentence outcomes.74 The
same prosecutorial discretion, assisted by legislative efforts in some
cases, allows prosecutors to evade mandatory minimums that otherwise
might prevent prosecutors from crafting plea deals below the mandatory
minimum term. Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums almost
certainly deepen the sentencing differential rather than minimize it.
If criminals are not being under-punished despite the existence of a
large sentencing differential, that can only mean one thing: defendants
are being deterred from exercising their trial rights because of a
substantial trial penalty. As Professor Birke observes, the existence of a
trial penalty does raise substantial constitutional questions, but that is
not grounds to conclude that a trial penalty does not exist.75 Indeed,
although the Supreme Court has paid lip service to the notion that trial
sentences may not be increased to punish a defendant for exercising his
right to trial, it has nonetheless unambiguously affirmed charging
practices that underscore the unchecked freedom of prosecutors to do
73. Id. at 536 ("[Gluidelines have tended not only to reduce the variation in sentences,
but also to increase the average sentence lengths.").
74. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471, 1506-08 (1993) (illustrating the ability of prosecutors to control sentencing outcomes
under federal sentencing guidelines through tactical charging decisions); see also King, supra
note 65, at 294 ("Both in bargaining over statutory ranges and in bargaining over sentences
within statutory ranges, parties have easily escaped from the constraints of the Guidelines.")
75. Given that a trial penalty is simply another name for a plea discount, the embrace of
plea discounts is irreconcilable with a condemnation of trial penalties. See Birke, supra note
9, at 228-29.
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just that. 76 Enormous sentence differentials may raise serious
constitutional concerns, but those concerns have not moved courts to
place meaningful restraints on prosecutorial bargaining tactics that
effectively penalize defendants for exercising their right to trial.
In short, there is ample evidence to support the argument that
criminal defendants routinely receive extremely "good deals." Although
a variety of cognitive biases undoubtedly lead defendants to prefer trial
over guilty pleas, sentencing differentials that make guilty pleas look not
only better, but better by orders of magnitude, go a long way toward
helping to overcome them. Even strongly loss-averse defendants might
start to doubt the wisdom of holding out for trial in the face of these
enormous differentials.
Still, like Professor Birke, I suspect that "good deals"-even ones
that are better by orders of magnitude-do not provide the whole
explanation for the high plea rate. After all, such deals are not available
in all cases, and defendants' resistance to pleading guilty is not only a
product of loss aversion, but also of a whole range of cognitive traits that
work in concert to inhibit plea bargaining. An explanation for the high
plea rate thus requires consideration of several additional facets of the
criminal justice system-especially as manifested in large urban
jurisdictions-that further counter cognitive biases that might otherwise
lead to insistence on trial.
B. Overcoming Self-Serving Bias by Minimizing Outcome Uncertainty
A rational actor's choice to plead guilty turns not only on the
assessment of potential penalty upon conviction, but also on the
likelihood of conviction at trial. Substantial uncertainty regarding the
probability of conviction, like uncertainty regarding its consequences,
may encourage loss-averse defendants to gamble on trial. Moreover,
cognitive theory predicts that as a result of self-serving bias,
confirmation bias, and overconfidence, defendants will harbor
unrealistically positive assessments both of their chance of acquittal and
of the likelihood of a light sentence.7  This section reviews several
features of modern criminal process that work to blunt those tendencies.
76. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (upholding life sentence for
defendant charged with uttering a forged check for $88.30, where defendant initially declined
plea offer of five years and was reindicted under habitual offender statute).
77. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2523.
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1. Minimizing Probability of Conviction Uncertainty
Access to discovery in criminal cases is far more constrained than it
is in civil cases. 8  As a result, the parties in criminal cases have less
information about the evidence that will come out at trial than do
parties in civil cases. This information deficit impedes plea bargaining by
making it more difficult to predict trial outcomes.7 9 Limited discovery in
criminal trials is a longstanding feature of criminal law that reflects and
responds to the fundamental asymmetries of criminal litigation.
Whereas in civil litigation both parties are entitled broad and equal
access to all relevant information in the possession, custody, or control
of the other party, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
restricts state access to the most relevant information in most criminal
cases-the defendant's own testimony-even while the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard places a heightened burden of proof on the
state to secure and present relevant evidence. The limited prosecutorial
obligation to share evidence with the defendant helps to level the
playing field. In addition, many jurisdictions utilize reciprocal discovery
rules that take advantage of the state's limited production obligations to
enhance its ability to induce defendants to turn over information while
maintaining relative information equilibrium between the two sides.80
This, however, gives rise to a puzzle. Notwithstanding that discovery
rights in criminal litigation are limited, as a matter of policy many
prosecutors' offices voluntarily maintain "open-file" discovery policies
that allow defense attorneys ready access to the information and
evidence in the prosecutor's file even where the law does not require it.8
Given limited formal discovery requirements in criminal cases in most
jurisdictions, open-file discovery practices seem odd, or at least worthy
of examination, because they represent a voluntary relinquishment of a
tactical litigation advantage.
78. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) ("[T]he Constitution does not
require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant."); Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case...."); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must
Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 541, 549 (describing discovery of criminal cases as
limited and noting that insufficient discovery in criminal cases contributes to both wrongful
convictions and unfair sentencing).
79. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (acknowledging that "the more information the defendant
has, the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the
wiser that decision will likely be"); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2494.
80. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2494.
81. See Prosser, supra note 78, at 593 (stating that most federal prosecutors' offices and
numerous state jurisdictions report having "some sort of open file" discovery policies).
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The reasons many prosecutors support liberal informal discovery
rules are undoubtedly complex.82 In his classic study of plea bargaining,
Milton Heumann described how prosecutors used informal discovery to
influence defense bar tactics and to discourage confrontational litigation
methods. 83  Defense attorneys learn that there are costs, often
significant, to invoking formal procedures such as motions practice or
jury-trial demands to secure rights to which their clients are legally
entitled, including loss of access to informal discovery. Informal
resolution of disputes is encouraged by prosecutors to relieve both sides
of the need to respond to motions and thereby save resources."
Defense attorneys who refuse to observe the unwritten rules lose access
to previously open files.85
Open-file policies may be useful not only to minimize motions
practice and pretrial process, but also to combat the defendant's
cognitive resistance to pleading guilty. By opening up the evidentiary
files early in the criminal process, prosecutors (and defense lawyers) can
more readily demonstrate case strength to defendants. Increasing the
defendants' understanding of the evidence, and thus the accuracy of
their estimates of the likelihood of conviction, facilitates plea bargaining
by reducing the area of potential disagreement between the parties as to
case values.
Informal discovery mechanisms, moreover, offer benefits over more
formal discovery rules. Although greater information allows defendants
to make better estimates about trial outcomes, the effects of
confirmation and self-serving bias might limit the persuasive effect of
enhanced discovery were it provided equally in all cases. Research on
confirmation and self-serving bias suggests that defendants will evaluate
new evidence as confirmatory of their pre-existing, overconfident
assessment.86 However, selection biases of defendants can be combated
through exercise of control over the information that is shared.
Informal discovery practices permit prosecutors greater discretion to
82. See, e.g., Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
781, 805 (1999) (stating that "prosecutors disagree a lot about discovery" and that their views
regarding discovery "vary widely").
83. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 69-75 (1978).
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id. at 74-75.
86. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem Of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 647-48 (citing research studies);
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
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choose when they will grant liberal discovery and to selectively withhold
information in some cases simply by "neglecting" to put it into the file.
87
Because prosecutors do not have to respond to formal motions, they risk
little by such selective omission.' Because the information provided
through open-file practices will usually be limited to inculpatory
information that bolsters the strength of the prosecutor's case, open-file
policies almost certainly counter self-serving bias by undermining
defendants' tendencies to ignore or discount information that conflicts
with their preconceived, optimistic views.89
The cognitive impact of open-file discovery policies can be further
magnified through use of devices such as "reverse proffers"-that is
presentations by the prosecutor of the evidence as the state would use it
directly to the defendant.' Although reverse proffers clearly require a
greater commitment of prosecutorial resources, and thus likely are
reserved for white collar and other particularly time-intensive cases, the
tactic can serve as an especially effective debiasing technique because it
facilitates a defendant's ability to overcome her tendency towards over-
optimism and see the case from the prosecutor's or the jury's
perspective.9"
Of course, even with perfect access to the file, calculating
probabilities of conviction remains an imprecise science. No one can say
for certain what will happen in any particular case should it go before a
87. See Prosser, supra note 78, at 593 n.215 (noting survey data showing "many working
exceptions to the stated 'open file' policy" employed by Wisconsin prosecutors).
88. Of course, there is a reputational cost to using deceptive practices. However, the
reputational costs of infrequent selective deception may not be very high.
89. See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2097, 2141 (2000) ("Prosecutors aiming for guilty pleas have the strongest incentive to
disclose in cases where their evidence is most overwhelming. In the weaker cases, the very
ones where discovery is most likely to make a difference to the defendant, there is less
incentive for a prosecutor to disclose and more reason to play 'hard ball' when the rules
permit it."); Prosser, supra note 78, at 593 n.215 (reporting results of survey by Wisconsin law
students of local prosecutors offices finding, inter alia, that most discovery in criminal cases
was the product of informal procedures such as open-file policies and that "most of the
information disclosed was inculpatory rather than exculpatory").
90. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2525 (describing reverse-proffers as an effective technique
to overcome resistance to plead guilty because "defendants are often impressed to hear
prosecutors' forceful explanations of how the government could convict them at trial"); Mary
Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal
Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2006)
(explaining that "AUSAs in the USAO-DC routinely make pre-indictment 'reverse proffers"'
to the targets of investigations).
91. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2523 ("By far the most successful debiasing technique is to
have clients consider the opposite.").
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jury; the vagaries of trial are too great even for experienced prosecutors
and defense lawyers to perfectly anticipate. This ambiguity might
therefore lead overconfident defendants to systematically overestimate
their chances at trial and to reject plea bargains even when the
probabilities seem skewed heavily toward pleading guilty. Open-file
discovery policies and the strategic use of reverse-proffers both help to
reduce ambiguity and shift the defendant's perspective. Thus, they
facilitate plea bargaining.
A second feature of discovery law further enhances the effects of
liberal informal discovery policies on facilitating guilty pleas. While
most prosecutors are willing to permit defendants access to the
inculpatory evidence in the file precisely because such access facilitates
guilty pleas, open access to exculpatory evidence is more problematic.
Although Brady v. Maryland2 purports to require prosecutors to turn
over exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants, Brady has been
consistently construed in ways that minimize its adverse impact on plea
bargaining. For purposes of this Essay, I will note only two. First, the
timing requirements imposed by Brady arguably obviate any need to
produce exculpatory evidence prior to entry of a guilty plea.93 Brady
requires production of exculpatory evidence at trial;94 the Court has
refused to tighten Brady's disclosure requirements to ensure production
of exculpatory evidence prior to entry of a guilty plea. As a result, at
the time plea bargaining occurs, many defendants will have a fresh and
vivid picture of the inculpatory evidence after having reviewed it or
heard the prosecutor present it during plea negotiations. As a
consequence, the negative facts disclosed through open-file discovery
are likely to play a larger role in the defendant's evaluation of likely
outcomes than any positive facts based on exculpatory evidence that
have not yet been turned over, even if the defendant is theoretically
aware of that evidence. Second, the "materiality" limitations the Court
has imposed on Brady's reach necessarily mean that marginally relevant
exculpatory evidence will never be turned over to defendants, even
while similarly marginal inculpatory evidence is.95  Thus, current
92. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (holding that prosecutors do not
have constitutional obligation under Brady to produce impeachment evidence prior to plea
hearing). The Court's holding in Ruiz applied to production of impeachment material rather
than material evidence of "factual innocence." Therefore, it remains unclear if, and how far,
a prosecutor's duty to disclose such evidence extends under Brady prior to a plea hearing.
94. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
95. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985) (opinion of Blackumn, J.)
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discovery rules enhance the prosecutor's ability to demonstrate the
strength of her case and hide its weaknesses, which in turn makes it
easier to sell plea bargains to overconfident and egocentric buyers.
2. Minimizing Sentencing Ambiguity
Ambiguity, of course, attends both the guilt and sentencing phases of
a criminal trial. Just as relatively liberal discovery policies reduce guilt-
phase ambiguity, the two most prominent recent developments in
criminal sentencing practices-the spread of sentencing guidelines and
the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences-have had similar
ambiguity-reducing effects on sentencing outcomes. Defendants may
not know how likely it is that they will be convicted at trial, but it is
relatively easy for defense lawyers to demonstrate the limited range of
sentences that will accompany a conviction by referencing applicable
guidelines or statutory minimums. Guidelines systems and mandatory
minimums counteract the tendency of defendants to believe that, if
convicted, they will (or at least might) receive relatively light sentences.
With guideline sentencing tables and mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes in hand, defense lawyers can more easily demonstrate to their
clients the harsh consequences of a guilty verdict at trial and, therefore,
convince them more often of the relative advantages of accepting a plea
bargain.9 6
By minimizing the degree of ambiguity of outcomes at the time of
plea bargaining, boundedly-rational defendants with a tendency toward
overconfidence, self-serving bias, and confirmation bias can be swayed
to accept plea bargains more easily than if substantial outcome
uncertainty remains. It is almost certainly not coincidental that the
modern trend toward increasingly determinate sentencing schemes
(United States v. Booker' notwithstanding) has paralleled the increasing
prevalence of plea bargaining.98 The further reduction of sentencing
(holding that Brady obligations only apply to the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that
passes materiality threshold).
96. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 22, at 818 (explaining to client that guideline sentence
upon conviction after trial was seventy to eighty-seven months, and applicable mandatory
minimum was ten years, prompting client to exclaim: "That is too much time .... Damn, that
is too much time.").
97. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
98. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in
America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)) (noting
that plea bargaining did not become dominant mode of criminal adjudication until judicial
discretion was checked through rise of determinate sentencing, since "the more uncertainty
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ambiguity provided by guidelines and mandatory minimums further
facilitates negotiated outcomes.
C. Overcoming Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect Through
Framing: Pretrial Detention and High Process Costs
The mathematics of the trial penalty suggest that most defendants
need not make precise estimates of the likelihood of a trial conviction to
be convinced that a plea bargain is in their interests. However, a
handful of defendants, perhaps due to strong loss aversion, may cling to
their biases and refuse to give up their trial right regardless of the odds.
Cognitive research has demonstrated that, contrary to assumptions used
in rational choice theory, decision making does not solely turn on a
comparative evaluation of absolute values.99 Rather, decisions in the
context of uncertainty are influenced by perceptions of gain or loss
measured in reference to a perceived baseline or reference point.&°°
Because baselines impact perception, and thus decision making even
when the baseline is arbitrarily chosen, the framing of choices can have
a major impact on decision making.'" A defendant's aversion to suffer
certain losses, therefore, can be countered by framing the guilty plea as
a gain rather than a loss. Although people tend to take risks to avoid
losses, they are much more risk averse when it comes to protecting
gains. Although pleading guilty looks like a certain loss when the
defendant is free at the time the plea is entered and in shackles the
moment after, the perception of loss flowing from a guilty plea
diminishes when the defendant is already behind bars. Accordingly,
where math fails, jail almost certainly succeeds.
Substantial numbers of felony defendants are detained prior to trial.
Indeed, in state courts approximately one-third of all felony defendants
on average are detained pretrial, and in many jurisdictions, two-thirds or
more of felony arrestees typically cannot make bail or are not given the
option." In federal courts, approximately seventy-two percent of all
about what punishment would actually result from conviction," the more difficult to "price" a
guilty plea).
99. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129 (1994).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 129-40 (discussing framing effect).
102. BOGIRA, supra note 53, at 4; Weinstein, supra note 22, at 802 n.55 (citing BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 45 tbl.3.5 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs9903.pdf
("In 1999, 70.9% of the narcotics trafficking defendants who had a detention hearing were
[denied bail].")).
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felony defendants are detained pretrial. 3  A large proportion of
defendants thus make the decision to plead guilty not while they remain
"on the street" but from behind bars, minimizing the perception of a
guilty plea as a loss from the status quo baseline. The psychological
effect of pretrial detention can be quite powerful. Indeed, as one
experienced public defender noted, a defendant who wins pretrial
release ironically may make worse plea bargaining choices because it is
much more difficult for defendants who are not detained pretrial "to
'step in'-that is, to go from being free to being an inmate" by accepting
a favorable plea bargain-than it is for a defendant who is already
locked up to accept the same deal." Where the expected sentence
following a guilty plea is time served, and the cost of holding out for a
trial is continued detention, the perception that a guilty plea is a gain
and trial a loss is virtually overwhelming.
Needless to say, most criminal defendants do not pay out-of-pocket
for their legal representation. Approximately eighty percent of criminal
defendants are indigent and thus receive publicly financed legal
counsel.' 5 This does not mean that indigent defendants do not pay for
process; they simply pay in a different currency. Pretrial detention is the
most onerous process cost among the many burdensome process costs
imposed on criminal defendants. As numerous first-hand accounts of
the criminal justice system attest, even if defendants manage to make
bail or are released on their own recognizance before trial, the costs of
contesting a criminal charge can be astounding. Tedious lines to get
through courthouse security, interminable waiting for cases to be
called,"° strict limitations on what can be brought into the courtroom
(e.g., no food, no reading materials to diminish the tedium), and
seemingly endless continuances (that require working defendants and
accompanying family members to burn up vacation and sick days, incur
repeated transit costs, and require childcare arrangements to be made
103. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 414-15 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t513.pdf (showing that in 2001 approximately seventy-two percent of all
federal defendants were detained pretrial).
104. DAVID FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER'S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 217 (2006) (noting that pretrial release can have the adverse
consequence of "push[ing] many defendants to risk a trial rather than surrender" by accepting
a plea bargain that reduces their likely punishment).
105. Stuntz, supra note 32, at 32 (1997) (noting that approximately eighty percent of
defendants receive appointed counsel).
106. FEIGE, supra note 104, at 157 ("It is the interminable waiting, as much as anything
else, that grinds people down.").
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and paid for, etc.) can make the cost of fighting a criminal charge appear
greater than the cost of pleading guilty. All of these process costs
conspire to dissuade defendants from exercising their right to a trial. As
one public defender explained:
[O]nce you understand ... how high the frictional costs
of fighting a criminal case really are, the guilty pleas of
the innocent are not only predictable, but also seem a
natural product of the way the system is designed. Even
without the threat of jail, copping out isn't an irrational
choice. 107
These high process costs explain why almost every misdemeanor
defendant, in the end, resolves his case with a guilty plea. Where "the
process is the punishment," minimizing process is the best way to
minimize punishment1 0 Pleading guilty is almost always the best route
to truncating the process. High process costs also undoubtedly
contribute to the high plea rate in felony cases.
Even defendants incarcerated before trial pay additional process
costs to contest a criminal case. Although one might assume that a
jailed defendant would have little to lose in terms of "frictional costs" by
contesting a case-after all, what else does the jailed inmate have to
do?-in fact, even routine court appearances are often onerous for the
incarcerated defendant. In many urban systems, on court day
defendants are rousted from their cells before sunrise and transported to
the "bullpens"--crowded, dirty, and dangerous holding cells adjoining
the courthouse-where they spend entire days waiting for a visit with a
lawyer that may last as little as a few seconds, and an equally short-or
shorter-appearance before a judge that inevitably ends with the grant
of yet another continuance. While they wait in the bullpens, defendants
are subjected to drug sniffing dogs that bite," strip searches, and
numerous other indignities and rough treatment. Following their court
appearance, defendants then return to the bullpens only to spend
several more hours subjected to the same miserable conditions before
finally being returned to their cells, hungry and often too late for dinner.
Pretrial detention coupled with the unrelenting misery endemic to
107. Id.
108. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 241 (1979).
109. BOGIRA, supra note 53, at 6.
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most urban criminal court appearances are two ugly facets of the system,
but they serve an obvious functional purpose. By making the exercise of
legal rights so tangibly and immediately painful, high process costs
reframe the decision to plead guilty. A plea bargain presents an
opportunity to cut short pretrial detention and to end an interminable
and costly legal process Thus, what might at first look like a loss
aversion triggering event is reframed as a gain-protecting one. Similarly,
although the endowment effect suggests that a defendant charged with a
crime should initially place a high value on his right to a jury trial,
pretrial detention and an onerous legal process-by default or by
design-undermine that assessment by turning the right to trial into a
costly liability rather than an asset. So reframed, the cognitive effects of
loss aversion and the endowment effect point toward, not away from,
the decision to plead guilty.
The effects of pretrial detention and high process costs are further
enhanced by the use of high-pressure bargaining tactics that mirror the
ubiquitous market ploys that retailers everywhere use to induce buyers
to part with their money. "Today-only" and "going-out-of-business"
sales are cognitive devices, the effectiveness of which has been
empirically verified through ample business experience. Such sale
tactics are explainable as applications of the principles of loss aversion,
the endowment effect, and reframing because they recast the retailer's
offer from a loss (of the opportunity to shop for a better deal) to a
potential gain (of the opportunity to get today's sale price rather than
tomorrow's higher one). Prosecutors and judges similarly exploit the
one-day (and sometimes one-minute) sale tactic to induce reluctant
defendants to plead guilty. Every defense attorney (and prosecutor) can
tell stories of defendants forced to decide virtually on the spot, or within
absurdly short time limits, whether to accept or reject a plea offer with
consequences measured in years or decades.11 ° The routine use of high-
110. For instance, reporter Steven Bogira recounts a plea deal worked out with a
defendant in the midst of trial. BOGIRA, supra note 53, at 80-84. Charged with murder, the
defendant faced a trial sentence ranging from twenty to sixty years. Id. After the judge
permitted the state to reopen its case to put on the eyewitness testimony of a witness to the
crime, defense lawyers worked out a plea deal with the judge that would effectively save the
court two additional days of trial time. Id. The judge guaranteed a thirty-eight-year sentence
if the defendant folded mid-trial. Id. The defendant had twenty minutes to consider the one-
day only offer. Id. Because of Illinois rules regarding "good conduct" time, a thirty-eight-
year sentence effectively translated at the time to a nineteen-year sentence of actual time,
minus 2.5 years for time-served. Id. The discount for abandoning trial, therefore, was
actually 11.5 years of actual prison time. Id. The defendant took the plea. Id.; see also
DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A. 233 (1990)
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pressure bargaining tactics and exploding offers, and the ever-present
threat that next time one might find himself or herself standing before
an even more vindictive or unreasonable judge, places added
psychological stress on criminal defendants.
Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums also likely help to
adjust the defendant's cognitive framing and anchoring of the situation
in ways that make plea bargained outcomes look more desirable.
Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums provide a firm
reference point that allows bargained-for discounts to be more easily
presented as gains rather than losses from the status quo, helping to
neutralize the effects of loss aversion. '
Given the plethora of devices that function to make the prospect of
fighting a criminal charge costly, burdensome, and painful, and that
quickly change a defendant's conception of the status quo, it may well
be that loss aversion not only does not impede plea bargaining in the
vast majority of cases, but actually facilitates it. Defendants who
perceive their exercise of a trial right as the loss of a favorable plea
bargain will be much less likely to take risky bargaining positions and
may agree to worse terms than a non-loss-averse defendant would
accept.
D. Correcting Over-Discounting: Lawyers' Roles in
Facilitating Guilty Pleas
In his effort to reconcile loss aversion and guilty pleas, Professor
Birke concluded that the strongest explanation for the high guilty plea
rate notwithstanding loss aversion was systematic bad advice from
defense counsel.112  Although numerous structural features of the
defense bar undoubtedly are in tension with the lawyer's duty to
zealously advocate for clients, there is no data showing that competent
or exceptional defense lawyers go to trial more often than their less
competent peers.13  Indeed, although many good criminal defense
(defendant required by court to make decision regarding plea offer of 1.5 to three years
(maximum sentence after trial was 3.5 to seven years) while standing before judge at
arraignment hearing; request for additional time to "think about it" summarily denied).
111. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2519 ("If the initial charge and sentence serve as anchors
and baselines, any prosecutorial concessions look like discounts or savings-wins for
defendants instead of reduced losses.").
112. Birke, supra note 9, at 247.
113. Although there is at least anecdotal data suggesting that there exists a breed of
lawyers who do nothing but plead out clients to collect fees, this class of lawyer undoubtedly
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lawyers are eager to try cases, their own assessments of their client's
interests often dictate that they advise clients to plead guilty."'
Contrary to Professor Birke's conclusion, criminal defense lawyers who
encourage their clients to plead guilty probably enhance the rationality
of defendant decisions. Defense lawyers play an integral role in guiding
criminal defendants to make more rational plea bargaining decisions by
providing defendants with more accurate estimates of the strength of the
prosecutor's case, the likely consequences of conviction, and the "going
rates" in the jurisdiction for plea bargains. Defense lawyers thus
provide the basic tools that permit defendants to make minimally
rational decisions about whether to accept a plea bargain: an assessment
of the value of the defendant's trial rights. Indeed, the model of plea
bargaining as a rational market between players making informed
economic choices would be entirely implausible without the assumption
of the defense bar's role in guiding defendants to make reasonably
rational decisions.
Defense lawyers play an equally important role in combating the
cognitive biases of their clients to enable them to make economically
rational choices. By using a variety of persuasive techniques, such as
helping the defendant to visualize the manner in which the evidence will
be used in court, defense lawyers can help to "de-bias" defendants and
minimize cognitive errors such as overconfidence and egocentricity. For
instance, defense lawyers routinely report that one of their most
important functions is to correct their clients' tendencies to over-
discount."5 Some defendants discount the future at irrationally high
does a disservice to their clients if only by squandering the bargaining power that comes with
the ability to make a credible threat to take a case to trial. See Alschuler, Defense Attorney's
Role, supra note 34, at 1183 (stating that "[sitories about the 'pleaders' are common among
members of the bar").
114. See Weinstein, supra note 22, at 805 ("For me, zealous advocacy for my clients
charged with federal narcotics offenses has become zealous harm reduction. Most of my
clients are going to be punished. I see myself as trying to separate out the many likely pleas
from the very few cases which should be tried. Once those two groups are separated, the
tasks are to win the trials and minimize the sentences for those who plead or are found
guilty.").
115. See, e.g., Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supra note 34, at 1309 (quoting a
"leading manual on the defense of criminal cases" counseling that lawyers employ "rather
forceful language" to persuade clients to plead guilty, and that "[i]t may even be a lawyer's
duty to use the kind of language illustrated by a recent Massachusetts case: 'The jury will fry
your ass.' 'You're going to die if you take the stand.' 'You will burn if you do not change
your plea.' 'The jury wants your blood."').
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rates, leading them to make decisions they soon come to regret.16 As
noted above, the decision to roll the dice against the odds and stand trial
in hope of winning an unlikely acquittal is in some cases the product of
discounting error or bounded willpower. Even defendants who
correctly understand the relative benefits of pleading guilty might
nonetheless place too heavy of an emphasis on their present well-being
at the expense of their future well-being, while others might lack the
willpower to make the utility-enhancing choice that they know will
better enhance their expected long-term utility. Effective lawyering
therefore includes changing the discounting preferences or bolstering
the bounded willpower of defendants."7 Selling guilty pleas to clients, in
other words, is one of a defense lawyer's most important jobs. Setting
aside the structural defects that plague indigent defense systems-gross
under-funding and client-agent conflicts of interest to name only two-
defense lawyers contribute to the high rate of plea bargaining simply
because they perceive it to be their appropriate function to correct their
clients' discounting errors, among other cognitive biases. Because of the
well-documented under-financing of the criminal defense bar,"8
116. Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of Discounting
for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 124 (2007) (discussing implications of
discount rates on sentencing and noting that criminals are "commonly believed to have
exceptionally high discount rates").
117. James Kunen recounted one such effort involving Roberto Lewis, a seventeen-year-
old client who had confessed to a robbery-murder. KUNEN, supra note 57, at 148-49. The
state's evidence was overwhelming-the defendant almost certainly would be convicted at
trial, and if convicted, would receive a mandatory term of twenty years to life. Id. His
lawyers concluded that his only hope was to plead guilty and hope that the judge sentenced
him as a juvenile rather than as an adult. Id. The client, however, refused to enter a guilty
plea. Id. A week before trial, Kunen met with his client, telling him to "picture this." Id. He
proceeded to describe, in detail, the basketball careers of two imaginary kids, from their
rookie years through retirement, running consecutive to one another. Id. "You take those
two careers, those two whole lives in basketball, that's twenty years .... 'Let me put it this
way,' I said. 'It's forever."' Id. Kunen then described the plea alternative:
"Do you have a high school diploma?"
"I'm workin' on that now."
"You could work on that, then you could start taking college credits.
And if you were studying and doing well and behaving yourself, they
could take account of that, and they could release you. In maybe five
years, seven years, ten years, you could get out. It's a long time. But, the
point is, what you do could affect your life. If you don't plead guilty, you
are going to do twenty years."
Id. Roberto took the plea. Id.
118. See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
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overworked" 9 and underpaid lawyers frequently have little time or
inclination, and virtually no incentive, to do much else.12
0
IV. CONCLUSION
Pleading guilty to a serious criminal offense is an intuitively
unappealing choice that most people can be expected to strongly resist
initially. This intuition is supported by insights gained from cognitive
research. But just as cognitive research casts critical light on
conventional economic models of plea bargaining that assume plea
bargains represent the rational product of predictable market forces, it
also provides a functional explanation for many of the most important
recent developments in criminal law, as well as some of the most
unattractive features of typical urban criminal justice systems. The need
to overcome criminal defendants' cognitive resistance to plead guilty
helps to account not only for the popularity among prosecutors and
politicians of determinate sentencing and mandatory minimums, but
also for the prevalence of pretrial detention, the harsh rigors of the
courthouse "bullpens," the routines employed by prison authorities and
court officials to transfer jailed criminal defendants back and forth to
the courthouse for court appearances, the long lines, endless waits, and
strict conduct rules in misdemeanor courts, and the generous grants of
continuances to criminal litigants. While many of the most important
developments in modern criminal law-the inflation of sentences, the
expansion of prison populations, the advent of sentencing guideline
regimes, and the widespread adoption of mandatory minimum and
career criminal sentencing provisions-undoubtedly are the product of
complex political, cultural, historical, and administrative causes, the
uniformity with which they contribute to the cause of inducing guilty
pleas by overcoming the cognitive resistance of defendants cannot be
overlooked.
Seeing the criminal justice system as an integrated plea bargaining
machine that functionally works to overcome the cognitive resistance of
legalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise; Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to
Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006).
119. For example, as reported by Steven Bogira, of seventy-seven prisoners held in
felony night court in a Chicago courtroom on one typical evening, three had private counsel,
and the remaining seventy-four were represented by two public defenders. BOGIRA, supra
note 53, at 12.
120. See Birke, supra note 9, at 239 (arguing that with few exceptions and regardless of
method of compensation or representation, defense lawyers have overwhelming incentives to
convince their clients to plead guilty).
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criminal defendants to plead guilty helps place its component parts in
perspective. Such a conception suggests that sporadic or isolated reform
initiatives are not likely to succeed, at least not if their goal is to improve
defendant decision making or systemic sorting accuracy. If these are the
goals, what is needed is not piecemeal reform, but system-wide
transformation. Indeed, recognition of the "cognitive design" of the
criminal justice system should cause us to question some of the most
fundamental notions regarding the function of courts and of legal
process in the administration of punishment. Meaningful reform of the
criminal justice system is unlikely to occur absent an abandonment, or at
least a reduction, of the drive to increase systemic leverage to obtain
guilty pleas while minimizing process costs. Indeed, the very notion of
maximizing "efficiency" in the prosecution of crime might need to be
reevaluated-a project that takes us well beyond the domain of both
rational choice theory and cognitive science.
* * *
